How often do Africans choose their national leaders through elections? And how frequently does the opposition win? In which countries has the military found ways of gaining political office through coups d'état, today as in the past? Be they civilian or military, elected or not, how long do leaders remain in power on the continent? Who is the current record-holder for longevity in government in a region that has accustomed us to the “eternal” Gaddafi, Mobutu, or Mugabe?
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Quanto spesso gli africani scelgono i loro leader nazionali attraverso elezioni? Magari anche con sorprendenti vittorie dell’opposizione? Oppure sono ancora i militari che continuano a imperversare e dettare la linea, oggi come in passato, attraverso colpi di stato? E, siano essi civili o militari, eletti oppure no, quanto a lungo restano al potere questi stessi leader? Chi detiene, attualmente, il primato di longevità al governo in una regione che ci ha abituati ai vari – inamovibili – Gheddafi, Mobutu o Mugabe?
The "Indo-Pacific" is a strategic construct that arose at a time of a potential transition in the Asian security order.
The Western Indian Ocean (the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian/Persian Gulf) is the new Gulf powers’ battlefield. Saudi Arabia and Iran, as already in the Middle East, are vying for hegemony in this sub-region: the Gulf monarchies also compete for influence, especially after the 2017 Qatari crisis and Doha’s boycott by neighbours.
In the wake of the killing of more 300 Muslim worshippers by allegedly Jihadist militants during al-Rawdah massacre in November 2017, President Sisi launched a new military campaign - “Comprehensive Operation-Sinai 2018” - with the aim of putting an end to terrorism and restoring security within three months in turbulent Egypt. The military operation, which precedes the presidential election of March 26-28, 2018, has pursued growing repression of the opposition and militarization of institutions in the country.
The anti-terrorism operation carried out today in Foggia, Southern Italy, marks an important moment for Italy’s counterterrorism. The raid comes as the culmination of a longer investigation initiated by Bari’s DIGOS (the national police’s special unit, which was monitoring a small, unauthorized place of worship named Al Dawa, located near Foggia’s railway station. Indeed, two recently arrested jihadists — including a former Chechen foreign fighter — were known to have regularly attended the mosque.
Negli ultimi anni l’opinione pubblica mondiale è stata ripetutamente scossa dalla violenza e dalle immagini che hanno accompagnato mediaticamente la rapidissima ascesa ed espansione dell’autoproclamato Stato Islamico[1]. L’attenzione dell’intelligence e del mondo accademico è stata attirata soprattutto dal fenomeno dei foreign terrorist fighters (Ftf) coinvolti nel conflitto siro-iracheno, per le modalità di attivazione e sviluppo, nonché per la mobilitazione raggiunta in brevissimo tempo[2].
Dopo il recente 25esimo anniversario della dichiarazione d’indipendenza dall’Unione Sovietica, un’altra importante ricorrenza si avvicina per il Turkmenistan. Il 21 dicembre 2006, infatti, scompariva Saparmyrat Nyazov, padre padrone della Repubblica centro asiatica, la cui uscita di scena spianò la strada alla salita al potere dell’attuale presidente, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov.
“Fighting al-Qaida before the Huthis”: the United Arab Emirates (Uae) have recently rebalanced their military commitment in Yemen, prioritizing counterterrorism operations against jihadi groups, in particular with regard to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Aqap). Since March 2015, the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen against Zaydi Shia militias (the Huthis of Ansarullah, plus former president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s loyalists) has been marking a watershed for Gulf monarchies’ military projection outside their boundaries.